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Introduction: How to Learn What Works 
Evidence-Based Policy: Motivation and Overview 
The need for evidence-based policy in the field of education is increasingly recognized 
(e.g., Commission of the European Communities 2007). However, providing empirical 
evidence suitable for guiding policy is not an easy task, because it refers to causal inferences 
that require special research methods which are not always easy to communicate due to their 
technical complexity. This paper surveys the methods that the economics profession has 
increasingly used over the past decade to estimate effects of educational policies and 
practices. These methods are designed to distinguish accidental association from causation. 
They provide empirical strategies to identify the causal impact of different reforms on any 
kind of educational outcomes. 
The paper is addressed at policy-makers, practitioners, students, and researchers from other 
fields who are interested in learning about causal relationships at work in education, but are 
not familiar with modern econometric techniques. Among researchers, the exposition is not 
aimed at econometricians who use these techniques, but rather at essentially any interested 
non-econometrician – be it theoretical or macro economists or non-economist education 
researchers. The aim is to equip the interested reader with the intuition of how recent methods 
for causal evaluation work and to point out their strengths and caveats. This will not only 
facilitate the reading of recent empirical studies evaluating educational policies and practices, 
but also enable the reader to interpret results and better judge the ability of a specific 
application to identify a causal effect. To do so, this paper provides a guide to the most recent 
methods that tries to circumvent any econometric jargon, technicality, and detail.
1 Instead, it 
discusses just the key idea and intuition of each of the methods, and then illustrates how each 
can be used by a real-world example study based on a successful application of the method, 
with a particular focus on European examples. 
It is, however, useful to note that the methods described here are by no means confined to 
the economics profession. In fact, it was the American Educational Research Association, 
with its broad range of interdisciplinary approaches to educational research in general, which 
recently published an extensive report on “Estimating Causal Effects using Experimental and 
                                                 
1 For more technical treatments, the interested reader is referred to the technical literature on the subject such 
as Angrist and Krueger (1999), Todd and Wolpin (2003), and Webbink (2005). A standard introductory textbook 
to the econometric techniques that often uses examples drawn from the education field is Stock and Watson 
(2006). Similarly, Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide a guide for econometric practitioners that also contains 
examples from education.    2
Observational Designs” (Schneider et al. 2007) which in large parts deals with the same kind 
of methods described here. The issues and methods discussed in this paper basically apply to 
any quantitative evaluation of policies.  
To prepare the ground, the remainder of this introductory section presents the central issue 
and points out the limitations of standard classical methods that build on the idea of 
controlling for observable factors. Against this background, the paper starts its presentation of 
methods for causal evaluation with two methods based on explicit randomization – controlled 
experiments (Section 1) and randomized lotteries of oversubscribed programs (Section 2). We 
then turn to two methods that researchers use to emulate experimental settings using 
observational data in what might be called “natural” experiments – the instrumental-variable 
approach (Section 3) and the regression-discontinuity approach (Section 4). It closes with two 
panel-data-based methods that aim to account for endogeneity in observational data – the 
differences-in-differences approach (Section 5) and additional panel-data techniques (Section 
6). These six groups of evaluation methods are illustrated with a wide range of example 
applications, including evaluations of an early childhood intervention program, a voucher 
lottery, the effects of extended education on labor-market outcomes, a program that provided 
extra funding for disadvantaged students, a reform that increased the compulsory schooling 
age and abolished early tracking, and the effects of peers on student outcomes.  
The Issue: From Correlation to Causation  
Using standard statistical methods, it is reasonably straightforward to establish whether 
there is an association between two things – e.g., between the introduction of a certain 
education reform (the “treatment”) and the learning outcome of students (the “outcome”). 
However, whether such a statistical correlation can be interpreted as the causal effect of the 
reform on outcomes is another matter. The problem is that there may well be other reasons 
why this association comes about.  
For example, if schools with relatively poor student outcomes are induced to implement 
the reform, then we may well find a negative association between student outcomes and the 
reform across schools. But the reason for this association is a causal effect of poor student 
outcomes on implementing the reform, not the other way round. This is an example of 
“reverse causality”, where the outcome of interest actually asserts a causal effect on the 
treatment of interest.  
Another example of alternative reasons for the association is that of “omitted variables”, 
where a third variable affects both treatment and outcome. Think of differences in the   3
preferences for high-quality education among parents. If some parents value education more 
than others, then they will tend to be more inclined to lobby for smaller classes, and they will 
also support their children in many other dimensions, e.g., by buying them afternoon classes. 
If these other dimensions improve the learning outcomes of their children, we will observe a 
positive association between smaller classes and student outcomes. But we would observe this 
even if there were no causal effect whatsoever of class size on student outcomes: The third 
variable of parental preferences gives rise to the association. This case is also often referred to 
as “unobserved heterogeneity”, because the treated individuals differ from the non-treated 
individuals in ways that we do not fully observe.  
Whenever other reasons exist that give rise to some correlation between the two things of 
interest – the treatment and the outcome – the overall correlation cannot be interpreted as the 
causal effect of the treatment on the outcome. Broadly speaking, this is what economists call 
the “endogeneity” problem. The term stems from the idea that treatment cannot be viewed as 
“exogenous” to the model of interest, as it should be, but that it is rather “endogenously” 
determined within the model – depending on the outcome or being jointly determined with the 
outcome by a third factor. The problem of endogeneity renders estimates of the association 
between treatment and outcome based on correlations biased estimates of the causal effect of 
treatment on outcome. Reverse causality and omitted variables are two key examples of 
possible sources of such endogeneity.
2  
Economists have developed new techniques to address this issue, and they are the subject 
of this paper. The aim of these techniques is to form a “treatment group” (that is subject to the 
treatment) and a “control group” (that is not subject to the treatment) which are exactly the 
same. That is, they should not have been sub-divided into treatment and control group based 
on reasons that are correlated with the outcome of interest. Ideally, we would like to observe 
the same individuals at the same point in time both in the treated status and in the non-treated 
status. Of course, this is impossible, because the same individual cannot be in and out of 
treatment at once. Therefore, the key issue is estimating what would have happened in the 
“counterfactual” – which outcome a treated individual would have had if she had not been 
treated.  
                                                 
2 Other possible source of endogeneity, which may also be subsumed under “unobserved heterogeneity”, 
include self-selection (objects with different characteristics can choose whether to be treated or not) and 
simultaneity (treatment and outcome are choice variables that are jointly determined). In econometric terms, 
measurement error in the treatment variable can also be interpreted as an endogeneity problem, because it gives 
rise to a particular form of association between treatment and outcome (one that generally biases the estimates 
towards finding no effect, even if there was one).    4
The central idea of the new techniques is that if the separation of the population into 
treatment and control group is purely random and a sufficiently large number of individuals is 
observed, then randomness ensures that the two groups do not differ systematically on other 
dimensions. In effect, the mathematical “law of large numbers” makes sure that the 
characteristics of those in the treatment group will be the same as those in the control group. 
Thus, the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome can be directly observed by comparing 
the average outcomes of the treatment group and the control group, because the two groups 
differ only in terms of the treatment. The aim of the evaluation methods discussed in this 
paper is to generate such proper treatment and control groups and thus rule out that estimates 
of the treatment effect are biased by unobserved differences.  
Limitations of Standard Approaches that Control for Observables  
The “standard” approach to deal with differences between the treatment and the control 
group is to try to observe the ways in which the two groups differ and take out the difference 
in their outcomes that can be attributed to these other observed differences. This is the 
approach of multivariate models that estimate the effects of multiple variables on the outcome 
at the same time, such as the classical “ordinary least squares” (OLS) or multilevel modeling 
(or hierarchical linear models, HLM) techniques. They allow estimating the association 
between treatment and outcome “conditional” on the effects of the other observed factors.  
Take the omitted-variable example above: The factor ‘parental valuation of education’ is 
called “omitted” because it should be in the multivariate model, but is not. If we can fully 
observe the omitted variable, we just add it to the model, and the confounding effect is 
properly captured. But more often than not, we cannot fully observe the omitted variable: In 
the example, how would we get a perfect measure of parents’ valuation of high-quality 
education? But as long as part of this omitted variable stays unobserved, controlling for the 
factors that we can observe will not necessarily solve the problem, and the estimated 
conditional association will not necessarily warrant a causal interpretation.  
It becomes directly obvious that whenever relevant factors that are associated with both 
treatment and outcome remain unobserved, the classical methods have to be interpreted with 
great care. Over the past decades, it has become increasingly obvious in the literature 
evaluating education policies and practices that there are myriad important factors that remain 
unobserved in our models, often rendering the attempts to control for all relevant confounding 
factors in vain. Just think of such factors as innate ability of students, parental preferences for 
certain outcomes, the teaching aptitude of teachers, or the norms and values of peers and   5
neighborhoods. Even if we manage to obtain observable measures of certain dimensions of 
these factors, others – often important ones – will remain unobserved. Even more, controlling 
for observable factors does not solve the endogeneity problem when it is due to plain reverse 
causality, in that the outcome causes the treatment. The only solution is to search for variation 
in treatment that is not related with other factors that are correlated with the outcome.  
The same caveats that apply to the classical models also apply to another technique that 
has recently become increasingly popular, namely the matching technique. The central idea of 
this technique is to find matching pairs of treated and untreated individuals who are as similar 
as possible in terms of observed (pre-treatment) characteristics. Under certain assumptions, 
this method can reduce the bias of the treatment effect. But as long as relevant factors remain 
unobserved, it cannot eliminate the bias (see, e.g., Becker and Ichino 2002). In this sense, the 
matching technique cannot solve the endogeneity problem and suffers as much from bias due 
to unobserved factors as the classical models.
3 Given the limitations of classical and matching 
methods, in this paper we turn to research methods that aim to provide more convincing 
empirical identification of causal effects in the face of unobservable confounding factors. Of 
course, these methods also have their limitations, as will be discussed in this paper. 
I.  Tossing the Dice: Explicit Randomization  
We start with two techniques that use explicit randomization to build proper treatment and 
control groups that do not differ from one another in observed or unobserved dimensions.  
1.  The Ideal World: Controlled Experiments 
The first technique is to implement a randomized experiment. Although some people may 
have reservations with “experimenting” when it comes to social settings, the only important 
feature about controlled experiments is the random assignment of participants to treatment 
and control groups. From a conceptual perspective, such controlled experiments constitute an 
important benchmark with certain ideal features against which to judge the other techniques 
discussed in this paper. Ethical issues of conducting experiments are discussed below.  
                                                 
3 Matching techniques can still improve on the formation of proper treatment and control groups when they 
are combined with one of the approaches discussed below, where the latter ensures exogeneity of treatment and 
thus causal interpretation. For examples of such combinations from the education area, see, e.g., Lavy (2009) 
and Machin and McNally (2008). Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2007) is an example of applying matching 
techniques to the estimation of the effects of comprehensive versus selective schooling; evidence provided in 
Manning and Pischke (2006) suggests that matching-type estimation alone does not solve the endogeneity 
problem inherent in this setting.   6
1.1  Idea and Intuition 
In order to conclude that a specific educational reform or program has a causal effect on 
economic or social outcomes of individuals who participated in the intervention, we would, 
ideally, like to observe the same persons in a counterfactual world and compare the two 
outcomes. Then, one could argue that the difference in outcomes is really due to the effects of 
the intervention. As this is impossible, it is necessary to find research designs that succeed in 
constructing a setting that comes as close as possible to this counterfactual comparison.  
In this context, controlled experiments have alluring features that sometimes make them 
being referred to as the most rigorous of all research designs or even as “gold standard” (e.g., 
Angrist 2004). In the basic setting, researchers try to build two groups that are “equivalent” to 
each other. One group (the treatment group) will be assigned to a specific program, the other 
group (the control group) not. Apart from the assignment to the program, the two groups 
should be the same in terms of all other important characteristics. Like in a counterfactual 
situation, all outcome differences between the groups could then be attributed to the program. 
Creating two groups of individuals that are completely equal regarding important aspects like 
family background, social status, and the like is not possible as the groups consist of different 
persons. So it becomes rather a question of probability, and it is important to show that the 
two groups are equal with sufficiently high probability.  
This can be achieved by randomly drawing a sufficiently large number of individuals from 
a population and randomly assigning them to the treatment and the control group. If 
consummately implemented, this ensures that the two groups only differ by chance.  
1.2  An Example Study: The Perry Preschool Program of Early Childhood Education 
We can nicely illustrate the advantages of explicit experiments, but also some limitations 
and caveats, by an example study that was conducted in the early childhood education sector 
in the United States. The Perry Preschool Program was launched in 1962 in Ypsilanti, 
Michigan, when school authorities recognized the low school performance of at-risk children 
from poor neighborhoods compared to their well-off classmates. In order to improve the 
social and cognitive development of these children, they decided to test whether an intense 
intervention of high-quality early childhood education could help these children (see also 
Barnett 1985).  
The crucial feature of this program is that it was conducted as a controlled experiment. In 
particular, 123 at-risk children at ages 3-4 were randomly assigned to a treatment and a 
control group (see Belfield et al. 2006). The 58 children in the treatment group received a   7
high-quality preschool program for one or two (academic) years, including daily center-based 
care in small groups, home visiting each weekday, and group meetings of the parents. The 65 
children in the control group did not receive these services.  
The study is particular in having an extraordinarily long-lasting design. The members of 
both groups were followed until adulthood and have been evaluated several times. The most 
recent study was conducted when participants were aged 40. Comparing average social and 
economic outcomes of the adults in the treatment group and in the control group, the study 
shows considerably better outcomes for the treatment group in several dimensions. Among 
others, on average the treated individuals had significantly higher earnings, higher probability 
of high-school completion, and fewer incidents of crime than the adults from the control 
group. The study also reaches a positive net evaluation for the public at large, as the benefits 
of the program (in terms of higher tax revenues and lower welfare payments) by far exceed 
the costs. As the assignment to treatment and control group was random, it can be concluded 
that it is the early childhood education that caused the difference in outcomes. The study can 
thus show a causal effect of the two-year preschool program on the better outcomes.  
The study identifies convincing experimental evidence on the effects of the preschool 
program on later outcomes. However, it is not clear to which extent the results can be 
generalized. While the assignment of children to the groups was random, the choice of the 
underlying sample was explicitly targeted at at-risk children, limiting the “external validity” 
of the study to this sample. That is, the causal inference is limited to the specific group of 
African-American children from disadvantaged backgrounds. If the selection process had 
been completely random, effects might have differed. But generalized results that are valid for 
the whole population were not the aim of this specific experiment. Focusing on the effects for 
specific sub-groups is often more interesting and relevant from a political point of view. 
1.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
Research on several other topics in education has made use of controlled experiments. One 
of the most well-known is the so-called Project STAR in the U.S. state of Tennessee that 
randomly assigned students and teachers to classes of different size. This class-size 
experiment has been subjected to extensive research (e.g., Finn and Achilles 1990) that, 
among others, also takes into account incomplete randomization caused by later switching 
between classes due to behavioral problems of students and relocation of families (see 
Krueger 1999). However, substantial worries remain with the implementation of the   8
experiment which may compromise its evidence on the effects of class size on student 
achievement (see Hanushek 1999).  
More recently, several experiments have been implemented to study the effects of 
incentives on later educational outcomes. A study by Angrist and Lavy (2009) randomly 
assigns cash incentives to Israeli high-school students if they pass the final exam. Bettinger 
(2008) evaluates the effects of small cash payments to primary-school students for successful 
completion of standardized tests. Both show positive effects of the incentives in the treatment 
group. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) implement an experiment on teacher 
performance pay in India. Kremer (2003) summarizes several other randomized evaluations 
of several educational programs in developing countries, including cash transfers for school 
attendance, free school meals, free school uniforms, deworming treatments, and increased 
inputs such as textbooks, flip charts, or a second teacher. 
One drawback of explicit experiments is that they tend to be set in a somewhat artificial 
situation different from real life. Being aware of their participation in an experiment, both 
individuals of the treatment and control group could act differently from their “normal” 
behavior. Ideally, participants should not be aware of the fact that they are part of an 
experiment. In their experiment analyzing the use of randomly distributed vouchers for adult 
training courses, Messer and Wolter (2009) created a setting in which both groups were 
completely unaware that they were investigated. The same can be said for situations where 
random assignment was done for a different reason than an experimental study, as in the case 
of the random assignment of college roommates that has been used to study peer effects 
among students (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003).  
But apart from these specific settings, the fact that participants in an experiment may 
change their behavior exactly because they are aware that they are observed (the so-called 
“Hawthorne” effect) is an example of how evidence drawn from controlled experiments can 
be compromised. This should be especially the case if one result of the experiment appears 
more favorable to participants than the other. External validity may also be hampered by the 
fact that a full-scale implementation of a policy could generate general-equilibrium effects 
(e.g., indirectly affect other schools that are not part of the direct treatment) outside the 
experimental setting that cannot be captured by small-scale experiments. In addition, there 
can be several factors that complicate both the random draw from the population and the 
random assignment to the groups. More generally, controlled experiments often suffer from 
issues of non-perfect implementation, compromising the validity of their results.    9
When randomization is done explicitly to conduct an experiment in a social setting, people 
sometimes raise preoccupations on ethical groups. “How can those assigned to the control 
group be denied the blessings of the intervention?” they are inclined to ask. Of course, such 
objections are only valid if the blessings of the interventions are proven and generally 
accepted. As in randomized medical trials of new medications, positive effects first have to be 
convincingly shown before the whole population should be subjected to a treatment. But once 
the blessings of the intervention have been established, trials are stopped and the medication 
is released for broader use. In a similar way, although increasing evidence may have made the 
blessings of early childhood education programs appear obvious today, no such thing could 
have been said at the start of the Perry Preschool Program, when the relative merits of 
treatment and non-treatment were hotly debated.  
One way to sidestep ethical preoccupations when there is a strong presumption that 
intervention has positive consequences for participants is to use a set-up of “rotating” 
treatments. In such a design, multiple different treatments are allocated to different treatment 
groups, with each group being exposed to one specific treatment. Although the lack of a 
control group without any treatment inhibits estimation of the effect of being treated relative 
to not being treated, such a set-up allows for estimation of the relative effectiveness of the 
different treatments (which may have been designed to induce the same total costs) by 
comparing outcomes under one treatment to outcomes under another treatment. It seems to us 
that such a setting, which is not subject to the ethical objections sometimes raised against 
controlled experiments, is unwarrantably under-used by educational decision-makers.  
2.  When You Cannot Serve Everyone: Lotteries of Oversubscribed 
Programs  
The second technique covered here is a special case of the explicit controlled experiment 
that exploits the fact that assignment on oversubscribed programs is often handled by 
randomized lotteries.  
2.1  Idea and Intuition 
Sometimes when an – often charitable – institution aims to implement a specific 
educational intervention, resources are not enough to finance participation for everybody who 
is interested. In such a setting, the implementing institution may opt for assigning 
participation in the intervention by a randomized lottery, so as to give each applicant an even 
chance for participation.    10
Among those who apply for the program, this boils down to being an explicitly 
randomized set-up. If the institution seizes the opportunity of the setting, it aims to observe 
both the lottery winners and the lottery losers, preferably before but in particular after 
implementation of the program. Then, we have randomly assigned treatment and control 
groups and can estimate the causal effect of the intervention by comparing outcomes between 
the two.  
2.2  An Example Study: Voucher Lotteries  
A well-known example of randomized lotteries of oversubscribed programs is that of 
programs that offer applicants the chance of winning a “voucher” that would pay for (part of) 
the fees required to attend a private school. Examples of such voucher programs that 
implemented a randomized evaluation include several programs in the United States, namely 
in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Dayton, Ohio. These (privately funded) programs 
were targeted at low-income families and provided partial funding for private school fees that 
had to be supplemented by the families. Each program was oversubscribed (i.e., there were 
more applicants than available vouchers) and participation was decided by lottery. In each 
case, both those who won a voucher (the treatment group) and those who lost in the lottery 
and did not receive a voucher (the control group) were observed in terms of background and 
desired outcomes both before and at several points in time after the program was 
implemented.  
Peterson et al. (2003) use the data from these voucher programs to estimate whether 
student performance, parental satisfaction, and the educational environment of the schools 
differed significantly between the treatment and the control group after the intervention. 
Given random assignment to the groups, such differences could be interpreted as the causal 
effect of having received a voucher. Among other things, they tend to find that parental 
satisfaction increased for those who received a voucher and that student achievement on 
standardized tests increased for those who used it to attend a private school, but only for the 
sub-group of African-American students. The set-up of the studies allowed them to estimate 
both the effects of the offer of a voucher (what researchers call the “intention-to-treat” effect) 
and the effects of actually using it to switch from a public to a private school (what 
researchers call the “treatment-on-the-treated” effect).
4  
                                                 
4 See Krueger and Zhu (2004) and Peterson and Howell (2004) for additional discussion of the results of the 
New York City voucher lottery.   11
2.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
In a similar spirit to the previous study, Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) estimate the 
effects of school vouchers in Colombia exploiting a randomized lottery. A similar approach is 
also employed by Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) to estimate the effects of increased choice 
among specific public schools in Chicago. Bettinger and Slonim (2006) perform a laboratory 
experiment within the field setting of a voucher lottery in Toledo, Ohio, in order to estimate 
the effect of school vouchers on altruism.  
A particular feature of the setting of randomized lotteries of oversubscribed programs is 
that the underlying population is just those individuals who applied for participation in the 
program. This will not necessarily be a random draw from the population at large. In 
particular, subjects who particularly like the program, who view a particular need for the 
intervention, or who place particular value on the outcome of the intervention may be more 
inclined to apply than the average population. As a consequence, results from such studies of 
oversubscribed programs will be valid estimates of causal effects for those who applied for 
the program, but their external validity for the population as a whole has to remain an open 
question.  
The most obvious advantage of studies based on randomized lotteries of oversubscribed 
programs is that they do not require setting up a separate experiment, but rather build on the 
randomization that is implemented anyway. In addition, these programs tend to refer to “field 
trials” that are enacted in a “real world” setting, rather than an artificial experimental setting. 
Similar to explicit experiments, evaluations of randomized lotteries of oversubscribed 
programs may be subject to Hawthorne effects and may miss general-equilibrium effects. In 
addition, motivating those who lost in the lottery to participate in subsequent surveys and tests 
may not be easy.  
II. Trying to Emulate the Dice: “Natural” Experiments  
The next two techniques aim to exploit variation in observational data that stems from 
sources that are exogenous to the association of interest. In a sense, they try to mimic the 
random assignment of controlled experiments by building on incidents where “nature” or 
institutional rules and design give rise to random variation.    12
3.  Help from Outside: Instrumental-Variable Approach  
The third technique discussed in this paper aims to identify variation in the exposition to a 
certain education policy or practice that stems from a particular source that is not correlated 
with the outcome of interest, thereby eliminating any part of the variation in treatment that 
may suffer from endogeneity bias.  
3.1  Idea and Intuition 
In the absence of intentional randomization, identifying causal effects is a challenging task. 
The so-called instrumental-variable (IV) approach is one identification strategy that tries to 
get close to the set-up of a controlled experiment using observational data. It tries to exploit 
the fact that nature sometimes makes “random assignments”. Therefore, such identification 
strategies are also referred to as “natural” experiment or “quasi-experiment”.  
The key idea behind this approach is rather simple. Think of the treatment variable of 
interest as having two “parts”: One is subject to the endogeneity problems discussed in the 
introduction, e.g., because it is correlated with some omitted variable. The other part does not 
suffer from endogeneity problems and can thus be used for causal identification. The IV 
approach aims to isolate the latter part of the variation in the treatment variable. This is 
achieved by using only that part of the variation in the treatment variable that can be 
attributed to an observed third variable (the “instrument”) which is not otherwise correlated 
with the outcome (or with omitted variables that are correlated with the outcome). Having 
information on such an instrument allows us to isolate variation in treatment that is exogenous 
to our model and thus to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal effect of treatment on 
outcome.  
The “trick” of IV estimation is then to find a convincing instrumental variable – one that is 
associated with the treatment variable (a characteristic called “instrument relevance”), but is 
not correlated with the outcome apart from the possible indirect effect running through 
treatment (a characteristic called “instrument exogeneity”). If such an instrument can be 
found, we can identify the treatment effect through a part of the variation in treatment that is 
triggered by variation in the instrumental variable, thereby overcoming problems such as 
reverse causality and omitted variables and achieving consistent estimation.  
3.2  An Example Study: The Return to Education on the Labor Market 
The study by Harmon and Walker (1995) constitutes a good example to illustrate the use of 
an IV identification strategy in educational research. In this analysis, the authors estimate the   13
returns to schooling on the labor market, exploiting exogenous changes in the educational 
attainment of individuals caused by the raising of the minimum school-leaving age in the 
United Kingdom. The validity of standard statistical approaches such as multivariate 
regressions to estimating the effect of schooling on earnings stands and falls with the 
assumption that selection into higher and lower levels of schooling is correlated only with 
observed factors that also correlate with earnings. In the presence of an unobserved factor like 
ability which is correlated with schooling and also with earnings, the standard estimates 
would be biased upward. On the other hand, measurement error in the schooling variable 
would downward bias standard estimates.  
To cope with these problems, the study uses variables indicating changes in laws 
determining the minimum school-leaving age as an instrumental variable for years of 
schooling. This is possible as individuals in the sample (employed males aged 18-64) faced 
different minimum school-leaving ages during their youth because two legislative changes 
raised the minimum school-leaving age from 14 to 15 in 1947 and from 15 to 16 in 1971. The 
two key assumptions of IV are convincingly met. First, an increase in the minimum school-
leaving age induces at least part of the population to stay in school longer. Second, this 
change in legislation should have no effect on individuals’ earnings other than the indirect 
effect through increased schooling.  
The IV estimates of Harmon and Walker (1995) suggest a rate of return to schooling of 
about 15%, i.e., each additional year of schooling raises earnings by 15%. This estimate is 
roughly three times as large as a corresponding standard (OLS) estimate. Moreover, standard 
tests indicate the presence of endogeneity in the schooling variable in their study, which 
fosters the concern that standard estimates are biased and, hence, IV estimates should be more 
reliable.  
However, one should always interpret IV estimates carefully. If rates of return differ 
between individuals (are “heterogeneous”), Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) show that IV 
procedures estimate the effect of schooling only for that subgroup of the population that 
complies with the assignment, i.e., that actually changes the schooling decision because of a 
change in the instrument. Therefore, the IV estimate should be interpreted as a so-called 
“Local Average Treatment Effect” (LATE), i.e., as applying only to the “local” sub-
population that is affected by the instrument. In the present case, this suggests that the 
estimates reflect returns to schooling for those individuals with minimum schooling, whose 
schooling decisions are affected by the laws on minimum school-leaving ages (although   14
recent evidence by Oreopoulos (2006) suggests that in this specific case, the estimates may be 
close to the average treatment effect for the population).  
3.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
Changes in compulsory schooling laws have also been used to examine other important 
research questions. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2008) exploit an increase in minimum 
schooling from 7 to 9 years in Norway in the 1960s. They show that increasing mandatory 
educational attainment through compulsory schooling legislation encourages females to 
reduce teenage childbearing. Exploiting the same reform, Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
(2005) analyze the intergenerational transmission of education. Although simple empirical 
analyses reveal a positive correlation between educational levels of parents and their children, 
their analysis suggests that parental education does not causally affect their children’s 
educational attainment. Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009) make use of various changes in 
compulsory schooling laws in a cross-country analysis of 12 European countries. They 
confirm not only that compulsory schooling increases earnings, but also show that additional 
education reduces wage inequality.  
Currie and Moretti (2003) use a different source of variation to estimate intergenerational 
effects of education. They use the availability of colleges in a woman’s county in her 17
th year 
as an instrument for maternal education in the United States and find that higher maternal 
education improves infant health.  
Machin and McNally (2007) exploit a change in the rules governing the funding of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) across English school districts in an IV 
specification to estimate the effect of ICT spending on student performance.  
Apart from exogenous variation introduced through changes in policy, researchers have 
also used exogenous variation literally generated by “nature”. Haegeland, Raaum, and 
Salvanes (2008) use variation in educational spending induced by the fact that hydropower 
plants generate local taxes that finance school expenditures in Norway. Using the location of 
natural resources as an instrument, they find that standard techniques may be missing the 
actual effects of school resources on student performance.  
Hoxby (2000a) investigates the effects of competition among public schools in the United 
States, where metropolitan areas differ substantially in the number of separate school districts 
and thus choice opportunities. However, the number of school districts itself may be 
endogenous, e.g., because poor performance of existing schools may increase the tendency to 
open up new districts. To obtain exogenous variation in the extent of school choice, the author   15
uses instrumental variables based on topographics – namely, the number of streams – the 
logic being that students’ travel time to school was an important consideration when school-




When estimating the effect of school choice and competition on student performance in 
English primary schools, Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2008) exploit the fact that boundaries 
of admission districts effectively limit choice and competition. They use the distance from 
students’ homes to the district boundary as an instrument for school choice and the distance 
from schools to the district boundary as an instrument for school competition.  
Using data from the U.S. state of Connecticut, Hoxby (2000b) exploits idiosyncratic 
variation in cohort sizes to identify the effect of class size on student achievement. This effect 
is another policy-relevant research question where simple correlations fail to provide reliable 
guidance for policy-makers because important determinants of class formation are typically 
unobserved in the data. There is by now overwhelming evidence that the placement of 
students into differently sized classrooms between and within schools is severely non-random, 
being affected by parental choices of residence and school, schools’ placement of students 
into different classrooms within a grade, and school-level placement policies of school 
systems as a whole. Because natural randomness in the timing of births around school-entry 
cut-off dates gives rise to variation in cohort sizes that in turn drives exogenous variation in 
class size across grades in a school, IV specifications using such variation can overcome the 
endogeneity problems. Woessmann and West (2006) implement an IV strategy similar in 
spirit to estimate class-size effects in a number of countries.  
West and Woessmann (2008) exploit the historical pattern that countries with larger shares 
of Catholics in 1900 tend to have larger shares of privately operated schools even today. 
Using historical Catholic shares as an instrument for contemporary private competition, they 
investigate the effect of private competition on student achievement in a cross-country setting.  
Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) use variation in school attainment caused by World War 
II as their source of identification of labor-market returns to schooling. They show that 
Austrian and German individuals who were 10 years old during or immediately after the war 
went to school for a significantly shorter period than equivalent individuals in others cohort. 
They exploit this variation in educational attainment to instrument actual schooling.  
As these examples illustrate, IV specifications exploit exogenous variation from very 
different sources, including policy changes, truly natural variations, and historical 
                                                 
5 See Rothstein (2007) and Hoxby (2007) for further discussion of this approach.   16
circumstances. In practice, the key to success in any IV approach is to find a good instrument. 
In any application, the main assumptions of IV (instrument relevance and exogeneity) must be 
carefully evaluated. If a convincing instrument is found, causal effects can be well identified 
even with purely cross-sectional observational data.  
The advantage of such quasi-experimental analyses is that they circumvent some of the 
leading problems with randomized field trials, such as the facts that they are expensive, time-
consuming, and difficult to explain to public officials whose co-operation is generally needed. 
In addition, quasi-experimental studies are not subject to Hawthorne effects because subjects 
are not aware that they are part of an “experiment”, and well-designed natural experiments 
can be able to capture general-equilibrium effects that randomized trials usually cannot.  
4.  When Interventions Make a Jump: Regression-Discontinuity Approach  
The fourth technique exploits situations where a treatment sets in discontinuously when a 
certain assignment variable exceeds a specified threshold level.  
4.1  Idea and Intuition 
Another approach in the spirit of “natural” experiments is the regression-discontinuity 
(RD) approach. The RD design is used in a specific setting where attendance or non-
attendance in a program or intervention is determined by whether a subject falls above or 
below a certain cut-off value of a specified assignment variable. A standard setting would be 
where a reform affects only those schools with a certain share of X% of their students having 
a certain characteristic.  
The idea of the RD design then is to compare schools in a sufficiently small neighborhood 
just above and below that cut-off, where the former form the treatment group and the latter 
constitute the control group. The intuition is that these schools will not differ by more than the 
treatment, because they are very similar in terms of the assignment variable. For example, if 
schools that have at least 70% students from a disadvantaged background are eligible to a 
certain intervention, we can compare schools that have 69% and 70% disadvantaged students. 
They hardly differ in terms of student background, but they do differ in that one school is not 
eligible for participation and the other one is.  
The comparison of units that are in a sufficiently small neighborhood below and above the 
threshold therefore comes close to an experimental setting with random assignment to 
treatment and control groups. Any jump or discontinuity in outcomes that can be observed at 
the threshold can then be interpreted as the causal effect of the intervention. In addition, the   17
fact that the assignment to the treatment and control groups follows a non-linear pattern – the 
discontinuity at exactly the cut-off value – allows the RD approach to control for any smooth 
function of the variable determining eligibility. The assumption required for the RD approach 
to capture the causal effect (the “identifying assumption”) thus is that there are no other 
discontinuities around the cut-off.  
4.2  An Example Study: Extra Funding for Disadvantaged Students  
The study by Leuven et al. (2007) nicely illustrates the use of the RD approach. They 
evaluate a policy that was implemented in the Netherlands in the years 2000 and 2001. The 
government decided to provide extra funding to schools with a high share of disadvantaged 
children who belong to ethnic minorities or whose parents have a low level of education. The 
criterion for being selected for the subsidies was a sharp discontinuity: Schools with a share 
of at least 70% of their students having a disadvantaged background were eligible to obtain 
the extra funding.  
There were two programs in the two years, one consisting of an extra payment per teacher 
and the other of a one-time payment per student that was earmarked for computers and 
software. The authors can use data on students’ performance in several standardized tests 
before and after the introduction of the program (both from schools that qualified for the 
subsidy and from schools that did not) to study the effects of the intervention. A nice feature 
of the RD design is that is has a straightforward graphical depiction: When plotting the 
outcome of interest against the assignment variable (the share of disadvantaged students in 
this case), there should be a clear jump in the outcome at the assignment threshold that 
determines the treatment status of the schools. In the Dutch study, there is no such jump in 
test scores, or – if anything – it is negative.  
In order to show whether this downward jump is really caused by the subsidies, they 
restrict their sample to schools that have a share of disadvantaged children of ±5 (or ±10) 
percentage points around the threshold of 70%. Then they compare the difference in the 
average test scores between the schools above and below the threshold, controlling for any 
smooth effect that the share of disadvantaged students may have on average test scores. Their 
results corroborate the graphical finding that average test scores of the treated schools are, if 
anything, worse than those of the non-treated schools. As the assignment to treatment and 
control group close to the threshold is supposed to be random, in most specifications they 
identify no significant causal effect of the subsidies on students’ achievement. For some 
outcomes – in particular, the effect of extra funding for computers and software on girls’   18
achievement – they even find a significant negative effect of the subsidy, which may indicate 
that computer-aided instruction is not the most effective way of teaching in this circumstance.  
The study can also address several caveats that sometimes arise with the RD approach. In 
principle, schools could manipulate the share of disadvantaged children if they were able to 
anticipate the intervention and the eligibility rule, which would undermine identification of 
the causal effect. However, because the date to which the cut-off rule refers is long before the 
announcement of the subsidies, this is unlikely in the given study. Moreover, there are only 
few schools that do not comply with the 70% rule in this study, giving rise to a reasonably 
sharp change of treatment status at the cut-off point.  
4.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
Several studies in the literature on the effects of class size on educational outcomes exploit 
discontinuities due to maximum class-size rules: Class size drops discontinuously whenever 
grade enrolment would lead to class sizes that exceed the maximum size determined by a 
specific rule. One can then compare classes just above and below these thresholds to obtain 
exogenous variation in class size (see Angrist and Lavy 1999 for Israel; Woessmann 2005 for 
several European countries; and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and Rønning 2008 for Norway).  
Another application of the RD design uses specified school-entry cut-off dates that lead to 
the effect that school entry ages vary due to the month of birth of the children. Children born 
just after the respective cut-off date are nearly one year older when entering school than 
children born just before the cut-off date (see Bedard and Dhuey 2006; Puhani and Weber 
2007).  
Ludwig and Miller (2007) exploit a discontinuity in the technical assistance that an office 
of the U.S. federal government provided to the 300 poorest counties to develop proposals to 
participate in the national preschool program called Head Start. Given that this assistance 
discontinuity generated a large and lasting discontinuity in Head Start funding rates, the 
authors can estimate the effects of Head Start on children’s health and educational attainment.  
Garibaldi et al. (2007) study the effect of tuition fees on the probability of late graduation 
from university. For identification, they use the fact that tuition fees at Bocconi University in 
Milan are not continuously increasing with respect to family income but are subject to 
discontinuous changes. Gibbons and Machin (2006) use discontinuities in school admissions 
patterns caused by admission district boundaries to estimate whether school quality affects 
housing prices. Lavy (2009) exploits a discontinuity in the assignment of schools to a 
program of performance-related teacher pay in Israel to estimate its effect on student   19
outcomes. Lavy (2006) uses a geographical RD approach that compares students in an area 
(Tel Aviv) that enacted free school choice to students in neighboring areas that were not 
subject to the treatment. West and Peterson (2006) exploit discontinuities in a school 
accountability program in Florida at a specific performance grade to estimate whether the 
threat to very poorly performing public schools that their students obtain a voucher to attend 
private schools affects public schools’ performance.  
The examples illustrate that there is a rich number of cases where educational policies and 
practices are implemented in a manner that involves a discontinuity which allows for 
evaluation through the RD approach. A problem with implementing the RD design is that it is 
not always possible to find enough observation units in an area just below and above the 
respective cut-offs. One solution is to increase the bandwidths around the thresholds, but this 
reduces the probability that the units above and below the threshold only differ by their 
treatment status.  
III. “Fixing” the Unobserved: Methods using Panel Data  
The remaining two techniques aim to account for endogeneity in observational data by 
exploiting variation where subjects are observed several times, usually (but not necessarily) at 
several points in time. Such two-dimensional datasets are called “panel data” and are 
extremely useful when there is no exogenous variation that could be exploited for 
identification in the cross-section. The common hope of all panel-data-based techniques is to 
be able to “control” for intervening factors even though they might be unobserved in the data. 
This is possible as long as these unobserved factors are “fixed” along the second dimension of 
the dataset (e.g., they are constant over time).  
5.  Does the Difference Differ? Differences-in-Differences Approach  
The fifth technique discussed in this paper builds on datasets that observe each subject at 
least twice and where part of the subjects changes its treatment status between the two 
incidents of observation. The incidents usually refer to two points in time, but they may also 
refer to two other dimensions such as different grade levels or subjects.  
5.1  Idea and Intuition 
Differences-in-differences (DiD) estimation is a simple panel-data method applied to 
groups in situations when certain groups are exposed to a causing variable and others are not.   20
Consider the simple case of two groups and two periods. In the first period, none of the 
groups is exposed to treatment. In the second period, only one of the groups gets exposed to 
treatment, but not the other. As a hypothetical example, think of two classes in a given school 
observed at the beginning and the end of a school year. During this school year, only students 
in one of these two classes have additional afternoon lessons. DiD estimation can then be used 
to answer the question, “What is the effect of additional lessons in the afternoon on student 
achievement?”  
The DiD identification strategy now consists of taking two differences between group 
means in the following way. First, we compute the difference in the mean of the outcome 
variable between the two periods for each of the groups; this is the “first difference”. In the 
hypothetical example, the first difference simply corresponds to the change in average test 
scores for each group between the beginning and the end of the school year. Then, we take the 
“second difference”, which is the difference between the differences calculated for the two 
groups in the first stage (which is why the DiD method is sometimes also labeled “double 
differencing” strategy). This second difference measures how the change in outcome differs 
between the two groups, which is interpreted as the causal effect of the causing variable. 
Hence, in our example, the effect of afternoon lessons on student learning is identified by 
comparing the gains in average test scores over the school year between the two classes.  
The idea behind this strategy is simple: The two groups might be observationally different. 
That is, the group-specific means might differ in the absence of treatment. However, as long 
as this observational difference is constant over time (in the absence of treatment), it can be 
“differenced out” by deducting group-specific means of the outcome of interest. The 
remaining difference between these group-specific differences must then reflect the causal 
effect of interest.  
The key assumption required for this approach to identify the causal effect is that the 
group-specific trends in the outcome of interest would be identical in the absence of 
treatment. In terms of the hypothetical example, the identifying assumption is that both 
classes would have experienced the same increase in test scores over the school year in the 
absence of afternoon lessons. The plausibility of this identifying assumption depends on the 
specific setting to which DiD estimation is applied. In any case, the identifying assumption of 
the DiD approach is less restrictive than the assumption implicitly made in standard classical 
methods, namely that the two groups are identical in terms of all relevant unobserved factors.    21
5.2  An Example Study: A Reform of Compulsory Schooling and Tracking  
The study of Meghir and Palme (2005) constitutes a good real-world example of a DiD 
research design. In this study, the authors evaluate the effects of a Swedish educational reform 
designed in the late 1940s that increased compulsory schooling, imposed a nationally unified 
curriculum, and abolished school tracking. DiD estimation is feasible because implementation 
of the reform varied between municipalities. The study focuses on individuals from two birth 
cohorts, 1948 and 1953. For a substantial part of Swedish municipalities (which we will call 
the “switching municipalities”), these cohorts were assigned to different school systems: the 
1948 cohort to the old system and the 1953 system to the new system. At the same time, in 
some municipalities both cohorts were assigned to the old system, while in other 
municipalities both cohorts were assigned to the new system.  
The DiD identification rests on the comparison of the change in average outcomes between 
the 1948 and 1953 cohorts in the switching municipalities with the change in average 
outcomes between the same cohorts in the municipalities that did not change to the new 
system. This empirical strategy implies making the identifying assumption that in the absence 
of reform, the changes in the average outcomes between the 1948 and the 1953 birth cohorts 
living in the municipalities that adopted the reform would have been the same as the changes 
for those living in the municipalities whose reform status remained the same for these two 
cohorts (conditional on other observed characteristics).  
The study finds that the reform improved both average educational attainment and earnings 
of the Swedish population, and in particular of children from less educationally advantaged 
family backgrounds. This analysis nicely illustrates that DiD strategies are often well-suited 
to estimate the causal effect of sharp changes education policies or practices, providing 
policy-makers with vital information even in the absence of controlled or natural experiments.  
5.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
DiD estimation in combination with a policy change is a widely used identification 
strategy. Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr (2009) investigate the relationship between features 
of the school system and the intergenerational persistence of earnings. Their empirical 
strategy exploits a Finnish comprehensive school reform enacted between 1972 and 1977 that 
shifted the tracking age in secondary education from age 10 to 16 and imposed a uniform 
academic curriculum on entire cohorts until the end of lower secondary school. As in Meghir 
and Palme (2005), DiD estimation is feasible because the reform was implemented gradually 
across municipalities during a six-year period. In both cases, it has to be assumed that the fact   22
that some municipalities enacted the reform earlier than others is not correlated with 
unobserved characteristics of the municipalities that are themselves correlated with the 
subsequent change in outcomes. If municipalities that would anyways have embarked on a 
different outcome trajectory than the others are more inclined to enact the reform first, then 
the DiD approach will not yield an unbiased estimate of the causal reform effect.  
Dynarski (2003) estimates the effect of student aid on college attendance and completion. 
In contrast to the previously discussed studies, this analysis uses the elimination of a student 
aid program for identification. In the United States before 1982, 18- to 22-year-old children of 
deceased, disabled, or retired social-security beneficiaries received monthly payments while 
enrolled full time in college. This program was terminated in 1982. The DiD strategy rests on 
the comparison of college attendance and completion for eligible students before and after the 
elimination of the program compared to the corresponding difference for students who were 
never eligible for this student aid.  
Another study by Jacob (2005) investigates whether test-based accountability raises 
student performance. More precisely, this study examines the impact of an accountability 
policy implemented in public schools in Chicago in 1996-1997. DiD estimation is applied 
here in two ways to identify the effect of the reform. The first is to compare changes in test 
scores for individual students before and after the reform in Chicago public schools. The 
second is to compare the difference in test scores before and after the reform in the school 
district of Chicago to the corresponding change in other, similar school districts that did not 
implement such a reform. In a similar study, Hanushek and Raymond (2004) use a DiD set-up 
to analyze how the differential introduction of accountability across U.S. states affected the 
relative change in student performance. 
Bénabou, Kramarz, and Prost (2009) use the DiD approach to analyze the effects of the 
policy of education priority zones in France, which channels additional resources to 
disadvantaged schools. They exploit the implementation of the policy in different schools at 
different points in time. Machin and McNally (2008) examine the introduction of the “literacy 
hour,” a specific teaching innovation introduced in English primary schools in the 1990s. 
Their DiD strategy is based on a pre- and post-introduction comparison of schools that did or 
did not introduce the literacy hour. 
However, a DiD strategy does not always have to include a time dimension. For example, 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) investigate whether educational tracking affects school 
performance and inequality in the school system. Their research design is based on comparing 
outcome differences between primary school (when no country uses tracking) and secondary   23
school (when some countries use tracking and others do not) in countries with and without 
tracked school systems.  
Jürges, Schneider, and Büchel (2005) use a DiD strategy to identify the causal effect of 
central exams on student performance. Their double-differencing strategy exploits the fact 
that in some German states, mathematics is tested in central exams while science is never 
tested in central exams. The first difference is thus given by the difference in student test 
scores between subjects.  
6. Information  Overflow:  Panel-Data Techniques and Taking out “Fixed 
Effects”  
The sixth group of techniques generalizes the previous approach and requires rich datasets 
that allow accounting for unobserved individual fixed effects.  
6.1  Idea and Intuition 
In recent years, extensive datasets have become available, in particular in a few U.S. states, 
which provide performance data for every student in the public school system and allow 
following each student over several years.
6 Such extensive panel datasets allow an even more 
extensive treatment of cases where unobserved differences are constant over time than 
traditional DiD approaches. As discussed in the introduction, neglecting such unobserved 
heterogeneity, which renders it impossible to observe all factors that influence both the 
special educational parameter to be evaluated and the outcome of interest, leads to results that 
cannot disentangle the effect of the policy intervention from the influence of other unobserved 
(or imprecisely observed) factors. Moreover, these more extensive panel-data techniques can 
be applied to the case where unobserved factors are heterogeneous across individuals (rather 
than groups).  
One of the most prominent factors in educational research that is hardly observable for 
researchers is the ability of individuals. For many problems that empirical educational 
research deals with, a possible ‘ability bias’ is a typical challenge. For example, if we try to 
evaluate whether the attendance of private schools improves students’ achievements, our 
estimates are only reliable if we can exclude that they are driven by differences in ability 
between students that choose to attend private and public schools. In the absence of a clear 
                                                 
6 While such extensive datasets are not (yet) available in European countries, data in some European 
countries – such as extensive register data in several Scandinavian countries and a new student performance 
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measure for this factor and of a controlled or natural experiment, researchers sometimes try to 
circumvent this drawback by observing adequate proxy variables such as family background, 
parental education, and the like. However, such an approach will generally not be able to 
solve the central problem of unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
As long as the factor that leads to unobserved heterogeneity – such as individual ability – is 
constant over time, it can be fixed by ignoring any variation in the level of outcomes across 
individuals and only focusing on changes over time. For this, we need panel data that allow us 
to observe the same individual at several points in time. In such a setting, we can control for 
“fixed effects” of each individual in that we account for an indicator variable that takes out 
mean differences between individuals, so that only changes over time in inputs and outcomes 
are used to identify the effects of interest. This way, the estimation is able to control for 
unobserved but fixed heterogeneity across units of observation. In the most elaborate settings, 
such fixed effects can be introduced at the level of students, teachers, and schools.  
A special case of such models is the classical “value-added” approach that controls for 
previous outcomes of the same unit when estimating the effect of some input or intervention 
on current outcomes. In the special case of observing the same outcome (e.g., a test score) for 
a unit at two points in time, this approach estimates the effect of a specific education policy 
conditional on the previous outcome. This value-added approach is only a special case of 
more extensive models that use cross-sectional information of the same units (individuals, 
classes, schools) at several points in time in order to take out the effects of any time-invariant 
factor, or fixed effect.  
Using the time dimension is only one approach to take out fixed effects. Even without 
having observations for the same unit at several points in time, one can exclude fixed effects 
by using special datasets. Specific studies can make use of contemporaneously observed 
academic achievements in two subjects of the same individual, which allows them to take out 
fixed effects of a student that affect all subjects alike. Other approaches use data on siblings 
or twins to address unobserved heterogeneity. The advantages and caveats of these special 
approaches will be discussed below. 
6.2  An Example Study: Peer Effects in School  
The study by Vigdor and Nechyba (2007) evaluates the effects of peer characteristics on 
academic achievement is a nice example of the use of “fixed effects” models to identify 
causal effects, which also highlights the limitations of restricted models. Peer effects are 
widely discussed in the education literature as a potentially important determinant of students’   25
outcomes. The literature on peer effects deals with several identification problems. First of all, 
it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the peer group on an individual’s outcomes from the 
effects of the individual on the group (see Manski 1993). Moreover, the choice of a peer 
group of an individual often is not exogenous, meaning that certain individuals, for example 
well-performing students, select themselves into specific peer groups that are already made up 
of other well-performing students. The authors analyze the effects of the characteristics of the 
student body in schools on academic achievement of individuals. Being able to use 
longitudinal data from all students in North Carolina public schools, they try to estimate 
whether the average achievement level of a student’s peers affects the performance of the 
individual student.  
Their data allows them to circumvent one crucial identification problem of peer effects, 
namely ability sorting across different schools. Certain schools could mainly attract high-
ability students, others predominantly low performers. The effect of the peer group could then 
not be distinguished from the characteristics of the student body attracted by a specific school. 
As the authors can match students with their classmates, they can use school fixed effects and 
eliminate the bias arising from systematic differences between schools. By estimating the 
effects of peer ability, measured by standardized test scores of a student’s peers in 3
rd grade, 
on student achievement in 5
th grade and using school fixed effects, they find a significant 
positive association between average peer performance and student achievement.  
Nevertheless, identification of causal effects remains a challenge if sorting does not only 
take place across schools but also within schools across classrooms. Parents who are 
especially keen on high-quality education for their children could achieve to have their 
children in classes with high-ability peers and/or match them with high-quality teachers. So 
the estimated association between peer and individual performance could also reflect the fact 
that similar-ability children tend to attend the same class and/or have the same teacher. 
Observing several cohorts of 5
th-grade students, the authors can – in addition to accounting 
for school fixed effects – match students with their teachers and include teacher fixed effects 
to avoid distortions that arise due to different time-invariant teacher quality across 
classrooms. Once teacher fixed effects are accounted for, any significant positive estimate on 
peers’ performance vanishes. This result suggests that even in a specification that includes 
school fixed effects, the association between peer and individual performance reflects a mere 
correlation rather than a causal effect of peer performance on individual performance. In 
reality, causal peer effects may be much smaller (or even zero) than more restricted 
techniques may suggest.    26
This result is corroborated by another test enabled by the panel nature of the data. The 
authors find that a significant association is evident between the performance of an 
individual’s peers in 5
th grade and her own performance in 4
th grade, even after controlling for 
the characteristics of peers in 4
th grade. Such a result that the appearance of apparent “peer 
effects” predates the actual exposure to the specific peer group is a telltale sign that the 
estimated association actually reflects selection into peer groups, rather than the causal effect 
of peer groups on individual performance.  
These results reveal how panel-data techniques that control for fixed effects can be put to 
informative use, while at the same time alerting us to the limitations of fixing effects at too 
aggregate a level. In this case, unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity is not eliminated 
when controlling for school fixed effects, because additionally controlling for teacher fixed 
effects completely changes the results.
7  
6.3  Further Examples and Pertinent Issues 
One recent application of panel-data techniques that take out student fixed effects is the 
estimation of teacher effects on student learning. As variation in teacher quality is difficult to 
measure, recent studies have started to use matched student-teacher data where teacher 
influence can be observed by estimating fixed effects (see Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, 
and Kain 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007). Such applications are able to control for 
individual student fixed effects by observing the same teacher with multiple classrooms, 
thereby focusing on differences in the performance of the same student with different 
teachers. Broadly speaking, teacher fixed effects in such applications can serve as measures of 
the overall effect of teachers on student outcomes, which can then be associated with 
observed teacher characteristics. In a similar way, Hanushek et al. (2003, 2007) control for 
unobserved student heterogeneity by including student and school fixed effects in rich panel 
datasets in order to try to estimate the effects of peer ability and of charter schools on student 
achievement. 
Other studies apply panel-data techniques to longitudinal datasets that do not provide such 
rich student information. Bauer (2002) uses individual fixed effects to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity when estimating the labor-market effects of so-called over- and undereducation 
of workers, suggesting that standard methods lead to highly misleading results on this topic. 
                                                 
7 In an additional step, the authors go beyond fixed-effects specifications to exploit a special feature of the 
North Carolina school system in order to use a plausibly exogenous shock to peer-group composition attributable 
to the opening of new schools in an IV specification, corroborating the result that there are no significant peer 
effects.   27
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) use Swedish panel data to take out municipality fixed effects 
when estimating the effects of a voucher reform on educational achievement. Bonesrønning, 
Falch, and Strøm (2005) use school fixed effects to estimate the effect of the composition of 
the student body, such as the share of students from minority groups, on teacher supply and 
demand in Norway. They also combine fixed effects with the instrumental-variable approach, 
using the arrival of refugees from former Yugoslavia as an instrument for the minority share. 
Falch (2008) uses school fixed effects to estimate how wages affect the supply of teachers at 
the school level under a specific wage-setting regime in Norway.  
In the absence of rich repeated information on educational outcomes, several recent studies 
have made use of datasets that observe the performance of the same individuals in different 
subjects. By including student fixed effects, these studies can account for any type of 
unobserved student characteristics that affects different subjects in the same way and estimate 
the effect of teacher characteristics or teaching practices not across but within students (see 
Dee 2005, 2007; Ammermüller and Dolton 2007; Schwerdt and Wuppermann 2009). If 
teachers are also observed in terms of characteristics that differ across subjects, such as their 
subject knowledge, fixed teacher effects can even be controlled for in addition to fixed student 
effects when estimating the effects of subject-variant teacher characteristics (Metzler and 
Woessmann 2009).  
Another strategy that tries to overcome unobserved heterogeneity by controlling for fixed 
effects is the use of data on siblings and twins. Fixed effects for the specific family 
background or – when having data on identical twins – even for genetic effects can be 
controlled for when observing different siblings or twins from the same family (see Card 1999 
for a survey of twin-based estimates of returns to schooling and Black, Devereux, and 
Salvanes 2007 for an application to the effect of birth weight on education in Norway). 
Despite the substantial advancements made over recent years, it remains a fact that panel-
data techniques can account for unobserved heterogeneity only inasmuch as the relevant 
unobserved characteristics do not change systematically over the panel dimension. 
Unobserved interferences that are not constant over time (or subjects or twins) cannot be fixed 
by standard panel-data techniques alone and require the use of the experimental types of 
methods discussed above.    28
Conclusion: The Need for More Policy Evaluation 
This paper aims to familiarize government officials, civil servants, educational managers, 
and other practitioners, as well as researchers from outside the econometric field, with state-
of-the-art evaluation methods that can produce causal evidence suitable for guiding policy in 
the field of education. If policies are meant to improve on outcomes, they should not be based 
on ideology or wishful thinking, but rather on proven effectiveness. But obtaining convincing 
evidence on the effects on specific education policies and practices is not an easy task. As a 
precondition, relevant data on possible outcomes has to be gathered. What is more, showing a 
mere correlation between a specific policy or practice and potential outcomes is no proof that 
the policy or practice caused the outcome. For policy purposes, mere correlations are 
irrelevant, and only causation is important. What policy-makers care about is what would 
really happen if they implemented a specific policy or practice – would it really change any 
outcome that society cares about? In order to implement evidence-based policy, policy-
makers require answers to such causal questions.  
This paper has surveyed new techniques that researchers have designed to go from 
correlation to causation. By avoiding technical language as far as possible, it is hoped that this 
little non-technical guide proves useful to education policy-makers, practitioners, and their 
advisors in their task of handling the problems and possible solutions to the causal evaluation 
of education policies and practices. Ultimately, the different methods aim to implement an 
“experimental” design where the population is randomly divided into a treatment group that is 
subjected to the policy and a control group that is not. Thereby, they overcome the problem 
that unobserved confounding factors may give rise to spurious associations and allow for a 
causal evaluation of the policy.  
By no means do we want to claim that the techniques described here are the only ones by 
which causal evaluation is possible. We also hasten to refer to the discussed underlying 
assumptions that have to be met in order for the different methods to yield causal estimates. 
But the methods discussed in this paper help to point out how more standard research designs 
can go wrong and yield results that do not capture causal effects. Also, the insight that 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies are best positioned to discern causal effects does 
not invalidate studies using more traditional techniques such as standard multivariate 
regressions. In many circumstances where experimental designs cannot yet be implemented, 
more traditional studies may serve to provide first hints of where to look and what to expect.   29
But the issues and findings discussed in this paper caution about possible limits to the causal 
interpretation of such studies.  
For a better understanding of the causal relationships of interest, there is a strong need for 
proper and regular evaluation of each educational reform. Convincing evaluation should be a 
central part of the design of any education policy and practice. This way, researchers, policy-
makers, and practitioners alike could learn what really works and what does not in education 
policy and practice. Results of such evaluations could then be combined with cost information 
to find out the most beneficial and cost-effective way to achieve desired outcomes. While 
such information is necessary for effective education policy and practice, of course it is not 
sufficient. Evidence alone does not lead to policy chance, not least because certain political 
and vested interests often stand in the way. Such considerations of how to get from evidence 
to action go beyond the scope of this paper. Still, sound evaluation is an inevitable pre-
requisite to ensure that future policies and practices will be more successful than previous 
ones in achieving the outcomes that they strive for.  
In order to achieve this, adequate data have to be available. There is need to accompany 
any reform of education policy and practice with a properly designed evaluation technique 
and collect the data required to perform the evaluation. More often than not, the data required 
for convincing evaluation will not be available “off the shelf,” but will have to be collected as 
part of the reform. Also, the proper evaluation techniques for any education reform will 
usually not be waiting to be simply lifted off the shelf, but instead will need to be carefully 
designed with respect to the specific problems that arise with the particular program that is to 
be evaluated. In order to set up convincing evaluation designs, it may also prove helpful to 
involve evaluators in designing the policy ex ante. With regard to data collection and 
evaluation design, especially Europe has to catch up in order to learn what works and what 
does not in education policy and practice.  
In medical research, experimental evaluation techniques are a well-accepted standard 
device to learn what works and what does not. No-one would treat large numbers of people 
with a certain medication unless it has been shown to work. Experimental and quasi-
experimental studies are the best way to reach such an assessment. It is hoped that a similar 
comprehension is reached in education, so that future education policies and practices will be 
able to better serve the students.    30
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Index of Technical Terms 
While this paper aims to circumvent econometric jargon, it still alludes to relevant technical 
terms used in the econometric literature, to put the reader in a position to link to the literature. 
This index refers to the places in the text where technical terms are introduced.  
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